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Indian Affairs in 
Colonial New Brunswick 
In 1843 the Chief Sachem and Captains of the Malecite tribe, meeting in 
full council at French Village, Kingsclear, near Fredericton, wrote to the 
Lieutenant Governor and Assembly of New Brunswick "to call the attention 
of your Excellency and Your Honors, to the fact, that in the other British 
Provinces, the Indians hold Lands in their own right; and your Petitioners 
cannot conceive, in reason and justice why that advantage should be with-
held from them; especially as it would then be only carrying out the intention 
conveyed in making the reserves: and effect that object — the welfare of the 
Indians — which has ever been professed by the Government".1 They were 
registering the plea of a people whose rights had never been acknowledged 
by the British government, and whose existence had only been sporadically 
noted by the colonial administration. The royal proclamation of 1763, which 
had recognised the property rights of the native peoples of the recently won 
portions of North America, had never been construed as applying to New 
Brunswick, for it was simply a part of that older possession, Nova Scotia. The 
safeguards concerning Indian lands and indebtedness, however questionable 
their ultimate value, simply did not exist in New Brunswick; the annual 
payment of presents, a commitment long honoured in the Canadas as a token 
of past services, was an institution unknown in New Brunswick. Little wonder 
that the council assembled at Kingsclear spoke so enviously of the Indians 
in other British provinces. 
In the early days of the colony there had been no need for a policy, as 
the Indians were so few in number, and so scattered, that they were not con-
sidered a threat to the incoming whites. With the arrival of the Loyalists, 
1 "Petition to the Lieutenant Governor, the Council, and Legislative Assembly from the Malecite 
Tribe, Kingsclear", 10 January 1843, Records of the Executive Council, Indians [hereinafter 
REX7PA, Indians], n.p., Public Archives of New Brunswick [hereinafter PANB]. I would like 
to thank Mr. Roger Nason for his advice and guidance through the Provincial Archives of New 
Brunswick while I was collecting material for this article. 
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"the Indians were driven back to the wilderness without much ceremony".2 
The first stirrings of government concern had to await the alarms attending 
the Anglo-American crises preceding the War of 1812. Lieutenant Governor 
Hunter, ordered early in 1808 to look to the defences of the colony, had to 
consider the danger that might arise from Indian discontent. He felt that the 
New Brunswick Indians were "less enterprising" than others, and would be 
of little use as allies; but they could become formidable enemies if war with 
the United States gave them the opportunity. Despite the fact that some 
lands had been allocated to them, they still retained their nomadic way of 
life; and the colonial government's refusal to do anything further for them 
had led to the complaint of "an injurious distinction between them and the 
Indians of Canada, on one side, and those within the limits of the neigh-
bouring American States on the other". Prudence, Hunter concluded, called 
for some attempt at redress, and he asked the British government for £, 500 
a year for occasional relief to the Indians.3 His assessment failed to impress 
Lord Castlereagh at the War Office, who was not to be panicked into increas-
ing Britain's financial burdens; the proper thing to do, he replied, was to refer 
the matter to the provincial legislature, which should make it its "particular 
business" to convert the Indians into "an useful People of the Community". 
Simply giving them presents was not enough, for the Canadian experience 
showed that while the practice did keep the Indians friendly, it did nothing 
to improve their way of life.4 
There matters rested until the outbreak of war brought reports that the 
Indians of the Saint John and of the Penobscot in the United States were about 
to meet. Somewhat alarmed, the Council agreed "to make a donation of Pro-
visions to these [Saint John] Indians on this particular occasion", the cost to 
be charged to contingency expenses. The result was most gratifying, for on 
July 10, 1812, the Council received an agreement guaranteeing the neutrality 
of the Indians of Charlotte County. A year later, £. 50 more was taken out 
of the contingency fund for Indian relief.5 In 1814 the Indians near Frederic-
ton were able to get £300 to add to their holdings at Kingsclear, a decision 
justified "more especially at this particular crisis".6 Once the crisis had passed, 
the contingency funds closed down. But the notion of providing relief to the 
2 M. H. Perley, "Memorandum on History of Indians", [1848], CO 188/106, ff. 205-223, micro-
film, PANB. 
3 Hunter to Castlereagh, 25 May 1808, Letter Books of the Lieutenant Governors [hereinafter 
REX/le/1-g.], vol. 6, Carleton: 1803-1810, PANB. 
4 Castlereagh to Hunter, 8 April 1809, CO 189/111, ff. 199-200. 
5 Minutes of 22 June, 10 July 1812, 19 July 1813, Records of the Executive Council, Minutes 
[hereinafter REX/min.], Vol. II, pp. 53, 59, 76, PANB. 
6 Minutes of 6 May 1814, ibid., pp. 88-89. The Assembly later protested that this was a mis-
application of public money, Journals of the House of Assembly [ hereinafter JLA], 1816, 29 Feb-
ruary 1816. 
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Indians had been established, and would reappear as the routine response 
to their plight. Of course, the emphasis would always be on relief, never on 
the discharge of obligations due former allies in war or trade, and certainly 
never with any implication that cash or kind was compensation for Indian 
lands taken by the whites. 
From the first, the Indians of New Brunswick had received their reserved 
lands as grants from the colonial government.7 If they wanted land, they 
had to apply for it by petition, either in their own names or through obliging 
whites, in the same manner as other settlers. Even so, grants to Indians only 
entitled them "to occupy and possess during pleasure".8 Since proper surveys 
were not made, any calculations of the amount of land on Indian reserves 
is largely guesswork. Further, the original authorisations were sometimes 
lost and in a few areas, reserved simply by right of occupancy, the acreage 
in indeterminable. The first listing of reserved lands was not published until 
1838, and then it identified fifteen reserves ranging in area from ten to 16,000 
acres. Northumberland County had 33,193 acres reserved, Kent 8,000, Carle-
ton 16,000, and Gloucester 4,000, for a total of 61,293 acres.9 Subsequent 
estimates always varied, although within four or five thousand acres of this 
figure.10 
The Reports on Indian Settlement &?., written in 1841 by Moses H. Perley, 
give the best account of the life of the Indians of New Brunswick in the 
colonial period.11 The Malecite were "forest Indians" whose traditional 
mode of support had been hunting and trapping in the Saint John River 
valley; by 1841 they numbered 442, in five locations. Their two major reserves 
were at Kingsclear and along the river frontage at the junction of the Tobique 
and Saint John. The tribal meeting place, Kingsclear, was a reserve of 320 
acres with a chapel, houses, and a population of 158. Being near Fredericton, 
these Indians were in close contact with whites, and had practically aban-
doned the hunting life: the men cultivated the fields and the women made 
7 It is worth noting that the only document referring to colonial New Brunswick contained in 
Indian Treaties and Surrenders (3 vols., Ottawa, 1891) is neither treaty nor surrender, but a 
grant of 704 acres on the Saint John River by the Nova Scotia government, 2 August 1779, II, 
pp. 28-29. 
8 The phrase is used to describe the "Nature of the Reserves" in "Schedule of Indian Reserves", 
31 January 1838, JLA, 1837-1838, Appendix 12, n.p. 
9 Ibid. 
10 For example, the 1842 figure was 62,223 acres. However Perley asserted that the Richibucto 
reserve had long before been reduced from 51,200 to 4,600 acres, and that on the North West 
Miramichi halved from twenty to ten thousand acres. Supplemental Report of M. H. Perley, 
3 April 1848, in Indian Affairs in New-Brunswick, Published by Authority (Fredericton, 1848), 
pp. 1-3. 
11 The report was printed separately by John Simpson, Royal Gazette Office, Fredericton, 
1841, and as an Appendix to JLA, 1841, pp. xcii-cxxviii. Future references will be to PR with 
this pagination. 
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baskets for sale in town. The much larger, 16,000 acre, Tobique reserve was 
more dependent on the hunt, although a few potatoes were grown. The men 
were able to get seasonal work rafting logs down the river, and some income 
was derived from the sale of hay and timber cutting privileges to whites. 
The Tobique Indians, Perley considered, were in "easy circumstances as 
compared with others of the Tribe."12 
The Micmacs were "saltwater Indians" who had always lived by fishing 
and fowling along the north coast of the province and the Bay of Chaleur. 
This was a larger and more scattered tribe than the Malecite, numbering 
935. The Micmac nation met every year at Burnt Church Point on July 26, 
St. Anne's Day. At that time, disputes between individuals were settled, 
chiefs and captains elected or deposed, marriages solemnised, and all public 
business transacted. The 240 acre site was, however, deserted in the winter. 
The twenty-one Micmac reserves ranged in size from ten acres to ten thou-
sand, with populations from zero to 188. The most populous was on the 
Richibucto River, where the Indians were of "steady industry and good 
habits"; there were five frame houses whose owners lived "comfortably in 
the English style", and some 120 acres of land under cultivation. A number 
of the residents worked as labourers at Jardine's wharves and shipyards, 
where they were well regarded. The 108 Micmacs at the Eel Ground had 
also made their peace with the white economy, employed in "getting lath-
wood, bark for tanning, treenails, and timber". The women made baskets, 
brooms and boxes. Altogether, thought Perley, "an industrious settlement". 
By contrast, the Indians of Pokemouche, 75 in all, lived remote from whites 
and retained their hunting way of life intact; they had no houses, no farms, 
but an abundance of game along the coastline.13 
It was apparent that the native peoples were declining in numbers. There 
were 224 Malicete adults, 218 children; 484 Micmac adults, 451 children. 
The best ratio Perley could find was at Memramcook, 51 adults to 75 chil-
dren; the worst amongst the Indians of the Bathurst area, 19 to 8. He spoke 
to many elderly, childless, couples who claimed to have had from eight to 
twelve children, all of whom died in infancy. Measles, whooping cough, 
scarlet fever, croup were all endemic, and typhus and smallpox still appeared; 
while visiting the Indians assembled at Burnt Church Point he observed at 
least one death a day. Native medicine, Perley considered, was hopeless in 
these circumstances, but there were no arrangements for attendance by white 
physicians save as a charitable and occasional gesture of compassion.14 
The influence of missionaries, the traditional bearers of white culture, 
was not nearly as great as in Canada, although important at times. The Mali-
cetes at Kingsclear were visited occasionally by two priests from Fredericton; 
12 PR, pp. xcii-xcvii. 
13 Ibid., pp. xcviii-cxiv. For a different view of the Richibucto Indians, see below, p. 11. 
14 Ibid., pp. xcvii, xc. 
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those at the Tobique by a missionary from the Madawaska area who came 
twice a year. The provincial government paid a small stipend for these ser-
vices. It paid none to the missionaries for the Micmacs, who came from Lower 
Canada and were considerably more diligent. All the Micmacs, save a few 
itinerant ones near Bathurst, had taken the pledge of total abstinence from 
alcohol through the efforts of the five Roman Catholic priests working with 
them. These men had to divide their time amongst the various bands, but 
always attended the annual meeting at Burnt Church, holding services in 
the chapel maintained there. Although they only stayed a fortnight, regular 
services continued to be held daily throughout the season, led by one or 
other of the chiefs. Perley credited the adaptation of the Richibucto Indians 
to the efforts of a resident missionary, the Rev. Joseph Paquet. The fact 
that all the Micmac men (unlike the Malicete) wore European dress was 
also presumably the effect of missionary influence.15 
The more influential white was, without doubt, the squatter, who was 
always liable to get hold of the choicest portions of the reserve lands. These 
men had settled on, or stripped the timber off, what they insisted was un-
claimed land. They were without the shadow of a title to their holdings, and 
could get no credit from local merchants; they lived in a state of constant 
uncertainty which discouraged any but the most slovenly type of farming. 
At Tobique, Perley reported, such men had hunted the Indians off the reserve 
"like wild beasts", and faced him "in hostile array", insolent and unrepent-
ant.16 Sometimes squabbling was the result of the inefficiency of the Crown 
Lands office and the inaccuracy of surveys. For example, a perfectly legal 
grant made in 1837 in the Tobique area inadvertently placed half the land 
inside the reserve, where the grantee had, in good faith, built a mill. 550 
acres granted for a parish glebe nearby was defined as lying between two 
boundary lines which were in fact contiguous, so that the grant lapped over 
onto the reserve.17 
When the existence of the squatter could no longer be ignored, the execu-
tive government made the proper denunciations, but the elected assembly 
was most sympathetic to his plight. The first official notice was taken in 1841, 
with two proclamations requiring those who had illegally occupied lands 
reserved by the Crown for the benefit of the Indians to leave immediately 
and desist from cutting the timber thereon.18 A list drawn up that same year 
showed 118 squatters on Indian lands, with the largest single group, 87, in 
Northumberland county.19 In fact, the government did not have the ability 
15 Ibid., pp. xcii, xciv, xcix-xcx, civ, cviii. 
16 Ibid., pp. cxi, xciv. 
17 Ibid., pp. xcv, xcvi; Report of Surveyor General, 30 August 1841, REX/PA, Indian Lands, n.p. 
18 Proclamations by Lieutenant Governor Sir William Colebrooke, 29 July, 16 August 1841, 
Executive Council Papers/Indians [hereinafter REX/PX 40], pp. 226, 229, PANB. 
19 "Return of the number of Persons who have settled upon, and occupy portions of the Indian 
Reserves, in the Province of New Brunswick, 1841". REX/PA, Indians, n.p.; PR, p. cxxviii. 
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to remove these trespassers. There was no doubt that they had the legal right 
to do so, but the necessary procedure, by an action for information for intru-
sion before the Supreme Court, was too expensive.20 The Assembly would 
not have supported any such move, for, as a Select Committee reported in 
1843, the "actual Settlers" on the reserves had contributed greatly to the 
progress of New Brunswick by improving waste lands that otherwise lay as 
barriers to the extension of thriving settlements. The "industrious poor 
Squatter" should not be harried off the land which necessity had forced him 
to seek out for a livelihood.21 
Any threat to the squatters' position provoked a stream of petitions from 
men who claimed they had bought their holdings from the local Indians. The 
resulting investigations sometimes bore out these assertions. Chief Thomas 
Nicholas of the Buctouche reserve, for example, sold one hundred acres to 
Samuel and Peter Allen for a horse and £ 9 cash. He kept the horse for him-
self and divided the money among his band. Altogether he sold over 1,000 
acres, mostly for provisions and animals used for the common benefit, and 
in so doing had the support of the vast majority of his band.22 But such agree-
ment was not always present, and bitter disputes over the election of chiefs 
followed from the opportunities they had to make money out of reserve lands. 
Since the government issued commissions under the Great Seal for life to 
chiefs, and the Indian practice was to hold annual elections, it was possible 
for a commissioned chief to hold on to his title even after he had been repudi-
ated by his band. The commission gave an appearance of authority to any 
land transaction such a chief might undertake. Perley estimated that Barnaby 
Julien of the Miramichi reserves had made at least £ 2,000 in the seven years 
following his commissioning in 1836, and had a steady annual and personal 
income of £ 300 from leasing the reserve lands of his tribe. Others were 
naturally eager for their opportunity to enjoy this bounty.23 
A further source of danger to the reserves was the lack of any restrictions 
on Indians going into debt. Some were gaoled by white creditors, but even 
worse were the occasions when a whole band faced extinction for not meeting 
its payments. Sometimes the situation got to the point where a government 
official felt obliged to intervene. Attorney General Wetmore found the 
Indians of the Little South West Miramichi whom he described as "Tenants 
at sufferance of the Crown", in debt to the extent of £,676.6.8. They had 
sold their cattle to make payments, and their hay had been seized. Crops in 
20 Report of Attorney and Solicitor General, 22 February 1842, CO 188/76, ff. 122-123. 
21 JLA, 1843, 21, 29 March 1843, pp. 206-208, 235-236. 
22 Paper endorsed "Indian Office at Buctouche", n.d. but c. 1858, REX/PA, Indians, n.p. 
23 Perley to Odell, 2 October 1843, REX/PX 40, pp. 7-9. The Julien family had been in business 
for some time. A complaint against Andrew Julien had been lodged by the Miramichi Indians 
in 1815, and at that time the Council had ordered that no sale or exchange of reserve lands be 
permitted. 20 October 1815, REX/min., II, p. 118. 
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the ground were also liable to be taken when harvested, leaving the whole 
band in utter destitution. Wetmore was able to scale down the creditors' 
demands, and urged the government to sell a portion of the Indian reserve 
that was "of very little if any use to them but valuable for a Mercantile estab-
lishment". The agreement he worked out provided for payment over three 
years, and only after the basic needs of the band had been met. But he avoided 
any general consideration of the problem, making no further recommenda-
tion for the Indians' protection save that they should only deal with one mer-
chant thereafter. The agreement, as recorded, was provisional, of no effect 
"unless the Government can and will use its exertion, in the protection of 
the land for the use of the said Indians".24 It seems unlikely that the exertion 
was made. 
Abuses came all the more easily because New Brunswick had no depart-
ment responsible for maintaining contact with the Indians. All correspon-
dence concerning them passed through the Provincial Secretary's office. 
Local unpaid Indian commissioners had been designated ad hoc from the 
earliest days, but it was not until 1825 that there was the first indication of a 
change. Upon taking office, the new lieutenant governor, Sir Howard Douglas, 
was greeted by two hundred Malecites at Kingsclear. Impressed by their 
demonstration of both loyalty and poverty, he issued provisions to them. 
Discovering that no provincial moneys were appropriated for their relief, 
he wrote the Colonial Secretary for authority to make annual presents as 
was done in other British North American provinces. He received approval 
to spend up to £.60 a year out of the colony's casual revenues, but was 
cautioned not to encourage the Indians to look for such bounty on a regular 
basis.25 Nothing daunted, Sir Howard was able to persuade the Assembly 
to vote £200 for the Indians on three separate occasions during his tenure 
of office. He decided to use the casual revenue money to provide farm tools 
and seed to encourage agriculture, while the Assembly's grants went strictly 
for the relief of the aged and infirm. He appointed a group of commissioners 
in 1826 to supervise the distribution of these funds to the Indians of Richi-
bucto, Chebuctouche, Kingsclear and the Miramichi The commissioners' 
instructions were to persuade the Indians to abandon their "desultory pur-
suits" and lead them to civilized life through education and agriculture. In 
reporting back, the commissioners were most optimistic and not a little 
unctuous, urging an "unremitting cultivation of a Hope which at length seems 
to dawn upon the hitherto benighted prospects of these original Masters of 
this Soil". Those original masters had expressed their eagerness for educa-
24 Wetmore to Lieutenant Governor [smyth], with enclosures, 24 September 1822, REX/PX 40, 
pp. 245-253. 
25 Douglas to Bathurst, 25 January; Bathurst to Douglas, 30 June 1825. These were the only 
contributions from New Brunswick to the "Reports from Governors . . . on the present state of 
the Aboriginal Tribes", House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1834, XLIV, pp. 485-486. 
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tion and their willingness to take up farming, and when they had received 
seed and tools for the following year's crops all would be well.26 But there 
are no further commissioners' reports for over a decade, no records of funds 
to buy farm tools; only a grudging payment of relief when it became unavoid-
able. 
Inertia remained the rule in Indian affairs; inertia so strong that it was 
even able to withstand an imperial initiative. When Colonial Secretary Sir 
George Murray overhauled the administration of Indian affairs in the Cana-
das in 1830, he wrote Douglas to inform him of the changes and told him to 
be guided by the new instructions "in any measures which you may adopt 
for improving the condition and promoting the interests of the Native Indian 
Tribes".27 Apparently no measures were contemplated in New Brunswick, for 
there was no reply. The omission passed unnoticed, and so did the colony, 
throughout the extensive British parliamentary enquiries of 1835 and 1836 
into the condition of the aboriginal peoples of the empire. 
But if there was little concern for the Indians themselves, there was a legis-
lative itch for their lands. In January, 1838, assemblyman Weldon moved for 
information on all the reserve lands.28 He followed this up a month later with 
a motion to authorize the sale of reserve lands in Kent county, and the use of 
the money so realised to provide relief for the Indians, under the supervision 
of commissioners. A lively debate ensued. Mr. End moved to strike all refer-
ences to land sales and proposed a policy of ameliorating the Indians' con-
dition with public money distributed by commissioners for "agricultural 
implements, clothing, bounties on whatever potatoes, grain or other produce 
they may be induced to raise, and generally in such manner as may allure 
them to the arts of civilized life". Mr. Street was agreeable to the commis-
sioners distributing public money, but at the same time wanted them to 
recommend what portion of the reserves in general could be sold to establish 
a fund for the benefit of the Indians — and relieve the Assembly of an annual 
charge. These alternatives failed to win approval, and the original motion 
was passed, fifteen to twelve.29 End tried again a few days later, and received 
approval for a motion to defend the equitable rights of the Indian tribes in 
Gloucester county, by having commissioners appointed to determine the 
best way the reserve lands could be made of benefit to them.30 
Six months after these demonstrations of legislative concern, embodied 
in addresses to the lieutenant governor, Sir John Harvey received word that 
the Colonial Office was once again interesting itself in the fate of the native 
26 "Report of the Indian Commissioners to Sir Howard Douglas", 28 February 1827, Assembly 
Papers [hereinafter RLE], 1827, n.p., PANB. 
27 Murray to Douglas, 15 March 1830, CO 189/12, ff. 419^21. 
28 JLA, 1837-1838, 24 January 1838, pp. 87-88. 
29 Ibid., 23 February 1838, pp. 187-189. Perley asserts that the land sales were not made, due 
to vigorous protests from the Richibucto Indians, "Memorandum", loc. cit. 
30 JLA, 1837-1838, 3 March 1838, p. 219. 
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peoples of his province. Right at the end of his term of office, Lord Glenelg 
sent out a letter with specific instructions. Harvey was to report to him "on 
the State of any of the Aboriginal Inhabitants who may still exist in the 
Province" — their numbers, whether they were increasing or declining, their 
condition, and their morals. More awkwardly, Lord Glenelg wanted to know 
what efforts had already been made to civilize them: how many were actually 
settled farmers? how many still hunters? how much land did they hold? 
what were the local statutes concerning them? And what did Harvey suggest 
to do for the amelioration of the Indians' lot?31 
Glenelg's letter was transmitted to the commissioners for the Miramichi, 
Richibucto and Gloucester county Indians. Their reports, although brief, did 
attempt to answer the questions put by the Colonial Secretary.32 On the Mira-
michi there were some 400-450 Indians living from hand to mouth, for the 
hunting had been ruined by the great fire of 1825. To make matters worse, 
whites had superseded Indians as casual labour in the timber industry. The 
local Indians, so the commissioners asserted, were loyal, harmless people, 
living in bark huts in the forests during the winter and spending the summer 
on the riverbanks. Their "natural indolence" prevented them from farming 
and there was no prospect of change in this respect. Their numbers had 
increased in the previous five years, and their morals had improved too, but 
not one Indian could be called "civilized". The report strongly urged the 
sale of portions of the reserves to provide a fund for the aged and infirm, 
but had nothing to offer the able-bodied Indians. The commissioners for the 
Richibucto Indians also felt that some scaling down of the size of the reserve 
would be useful: if the Indians had less land they would appreciate what 
remained all the more. There were only 120 of them, half what there had been 
in 1825, and only fourteen farmers, all unsuccessful, because their practice 
was to sow seed and then leave the crops unguarded in unfenced fields. Too 
many of the local Indians were addicted to liquor and spent their time hang-
ing around stores and shipping in the harbour, trying to sell baskets. The 
commissioners in Gloucester county were not too sympathetic either. Their 
Indians had declined in number by one-third in the previous decade, and only 
183 were left. Since the Indians did not wish to farm, the reserves were of 
little use to them. The best thing that could be done was to furnish relief 
through provisions and clothing.33 
These reports covered only a minority of the native population, but Harvey 
sent them off to the Colonial Office with a brief and unhelpful covering letter. 
31 Glenelg to Harvey, 22 August 1838, CO 189/15, ff. 252-254. 
32 Harvey to Normanby, 14 May 1839, enclosing commissioners' reports, CO 188/64, ff. 146-163. 
33 In a report three years later the Gloucester county commissioners noted the reluctance of 
the Indians to provide any information concerning their numbers, means of support, or exact 
location on their lands. A. Barberrie and T. M. Deblois to Odell, 4 June 1841, REX/PA, Indians, 
n.p. 
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Giving relief to such improvident people as the Indians, he wrote, only con-
firmed them in their indolent ways; yet he had nothing better to suggest than 
to supply provisions and clothing as the commissioners might request.34 The 
tone of the letter caught the prevailing mood at the Colonial Office, where 
there was a note of weariness after almost a decade of zeal for aboriginal 
peoples. The new Secretary, Lord Normanby, replied that rapid progress in 
civilizing the Indians could not really be expected, although he did not despair 
of their becoming farmers one day. He would not venture to give any instruc-
tions on how to ameliorate their condition, as he felt sure that Harvey and 
the provincial legislature would know best. Selling part of the Indians' re-
serves to provide a fund for their benefit was a good idea, and had been help-
ful in other colonies. Harvey should consult his Executive Council and any 
other persons knowledgeable of the Indian character, and if anything came 
to mind, he should by all means get in touch with the Colonial Office.35 Har-
vey had received the answer he had been hoping for: approval to do nothing. 
With a new administration came a fresh perspective. Due to the efforts 
of Lieutenant Governor Sir William Colebrooke, something approaching an 
Indian policy emerged in the 1840's. Colebrooke's interest was aroused and 
maintained by Moses H. Perley, who was his adviser on Indian affairs through-
out, and assumed the role of public spokesman for the Indians' interests. 
Perley was the grandson of a Newburyport pioneer who had led a group of 
settlers to the Saint John River in 1763; he himself had spent much of his 
youth travelling, hunting and trading with the Indians. Called to the bar in 
1830, he kept his contacts through several unsuccessful business ventures, 
and was appointed a commissioner in 1837.36 
Colebrooke and Perley reached some general agreement on the subject 
of the native peoples by June, 1841. Both were opposed to the issue of 
presents, Canada style, and both wanted to secure the Indians in permanent 
possession of the reserves. Colebrooke was especially concerned to educate 
both boys and girls in integrated schools near white settlements, "as it is 
not desirable to bring up [Indian] children as an exclusive class or caste, but 
rather to blend them with others". Perhaps it would be possible to found 
schools on the pattern of those recently established in the West Indies. The 
government might establish Loan Funds to encourage agriculture, and, mean-
while, the annual distribution of seed corn and potatoes should continue. 
Indian farmers would be allotted lands for their individual occupation, and 
their general interest in the reserves be protected by taking steps to prevent 
34 Harvey to Normanby, 14 May 1839, CO 188/64, ff. 146-148. 
35 Normanby to Harvey, 27 July 1839, CO 189/15, ff. 342-346. 
36 In 1822, at the age of eighteen, Perley accidentally shot and killed an Indian while at target 
practice. There may have been an element of atonement in his later championing of the Indian 
cause. Biographical meterial from W. A. Spray, "Moses Perley", manuscript prepared for Volume 
9 of the Dictionary of Canadian Biography. 
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their granting timber cutting or occupancy rights to outsiders. Colebrooke 
followed up his consultations with Perley by appointing him to consult with, 
and report on, all the Indians in the province.37 
Perley visited the Malecite Indians of the Saint John valley in July and 
the Micmacs of the Miramichi northward in August and September, 1841. 
To all he carried the same message. The government wished to make the 
reserve lands benefit the Indians, to improve their condition by forming them 
into settlements with secure title, and to educate the young not only in liter-
acy but also in farming and useful trades. The response was flattering. For 
the Micmacs assembled at Oxford Brook, near Newcastle, "The announce-
ment that the Executive was about to take some interest in their affairs, 
created great satisfaction, and caused much rejoicing".38 Those assembled 
at Burnt Church were quite willing to let the government take sole charge 
of their lands, and expressed their desire for schooling. Perley felt that the 
greatest ambition of each Indian there was to have his own frame house, 
and if assistance to build could be tied in with the encouragement of agri-
culture, the Indian would indeed turn farmer. The Micmacs elected Perley 
"Wunjeet Sagamow" (Head Chief), a title he was to use with pride over the 
years.39 
Whether his recommendations entirely justified the honour bestowed on 
him is questionable. Most of the suggestions he made following his visits to 
the Indians were those he had agreed on with Colebrooke before he set out. 
The scattered Indians of the province should be concentrated in a few settle-
ments: the Malicetes at Kingsclear and the Micmacs in the Miramichi valley, 
in villages that contained land held both individually and communally. How-
ever, Perley cautioned against a too rapid break with the hunting way of life. 
Once settled, the Indians' children could be sent to school, and any parental 
objections, he wistfully explained, be overcome by issuing school uniforms. 
It would be best to place the new villages near white rural settlements (not 
towns), so that the children of both races could go to school together. In 
order to combat the appalling mortality rate, medical attention could be 
guaranteed by paying a retainer to a local doctor. The cost of these reloca-
tions and services would be met by establishing a fund from the proceeds of 
leasing to whites all the reserve lands no longer needed under the new ar-
rangement. One or more Indian Superintendents, under a Board of Commis-
sioners, would be responsible for carrying out government policy, improving 
the social and religious state of the Indians, gathering and settling bands, 
encouraging agriculture and education. Thus the Indian would be paying the 
37 Reade to Perley, 16. 23 June 1841, PR, pp. cxxi - cxxii. 
38 Ibid., p. xcviii. 
39 Ibid., p. c; Perley was reprimanded for using his title in correspondence with the Colonial 
Secretary, Odel! to Perley, 18 May 1844, Records of the Provincial Secretary [hereinafter RPS], 
25 August 1842 - 19 June 1845, pp. 216-217, PANB. 
14 Acadiensis 
cost of his own"civilization".40 
Perley's recommendations were, not too surprisingly, in line with the pol-
icy that had been worked out for the Indians of the Canadas in the previous 
decade: assimilation by way of "civilization" through agriculture — and at 
no extra cost to the taxpayer.41 He had read the voluminous Parliamentary 
Papers containing correspondence and testimony about the aboriginal peoples 
of the Empire, and so knew the sentiments approved in England; in fact, 
he included unacknowledged excerpts from those Papers in his report.42 He 
subscribed to the idea of the Indian as "an infant requiring a guardian", who 
had to be under the paternal care of the Crown.43 Perley was a white man of 
his time, more sympathetic than most, but still trammelled by those pre-
suppositions he had taken with him from his earliest visits to the Indians. 
For example, he fully realised that the Indian hunt was an integral and eternal 
part of life, yet he often referred to it as though it were a self-indulgent sport-
ing activity that should be dispensed with in favour of work.44 But of course 
Perley was writing for other white men, not for Indians. 
By one of those quirks of fate that ruin the thematic approach to history, 
Perley's Report was almost overwhelmed and lost in the affair of the three 
Indians in Whitehall. This unpleasant intrusion from the colony took place in 
January, 1842, and created a general antagonism at the Colonial Office to-
wards anything emanating from New Brunswick for the balance of the year. 
It all began with Captain O'Halloran of the 69th regiment, who had accom-
panied Perley part way on his tour, and won some local fame for translating 
the Lord's Prayer into the Micmac tongue.45 O'Halloran inspired three Indians 
of the Restigouche with the hope that if they went to London they could get 
financial aid towards building a church, and perhaps get some of the colony's 
laws changed in their favour; he even gave them a letter of introduction to 
the Colonial Secretary. The Indians duly arrived, penniless, and presented 
themselves to the new incumbent, Lord Stanley. He was furious. Who is this 
Captain O'Halloran? No one ever mentioned his being employed among the 
Indians; send me a copy of his instructions immediately. The Indians were 
returned on HMS Warspite to New York, where the British consul would 
forward them to Saint John, and it was the Lieutenant Governor's responsibil-
40 PR, pp. civ, cvii - cix. 
41 L.F.S. Upton, "The Origins of Canadian Indian Policy", Journal of Canadian Studies, Novem-
ber, 1973, pp. 51-61. 
42 For example, Glenelg to Durham, 22 August 1838, where the Colonial Secretary contrasted 
the noble efforts of Jesuit missionaries to the disinterest of the British, "Copies or Extracts of 
Correspondence . . . ." House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1839, XXXIV, pp. 223-227; PR, 
p. cvi. 
43 Ibid., p. cvi. 
44 Ibid., p. xcvi, for one example. 
45 Ibid., p. cxxiv. 
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ity to get them home from there.46 The story got into the provincial news-
papers and O'Halloran complained bitterly that both he and the Indians were 
being maligned by Perley. The provincial secretary had a hard time smooth-
ing ruffled tempers.47 Then, in August, 1843, news came that another Micmac 
was planning to visit London. Perley was ordered to explain to him "the ex-
treme impropriety" of going. Apparently the Colonial Office was spared 
further embarrassment.48 
It was hardly a propitious time to get a sympathetic hearing for the Indians 
of New Brunswick, but in the midst of this correspondence Colebrook sug-
gested that since his province had no funds for resettling or educating the 
Indians it should receive part of the annual grant given Canada; and in the 
same letter he tried to make excuses for O'Halloran. The result was a double 
rebuff: there would be no diversion from imperial funds to Canada, and no 
excusing O'Halloran's conduct.49 When Stanley finally acknowledged Perley's 
Report, he expressed his approval of the "proper and judicious representa-
tions therein", but in such a vague and brief letter as to give no direction 
on the next step.50 But imperial approval was demonstrated in a more tangible 
way when Governor General Sir Charles Bagot offered Perley the office of 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Canada in 1843. The offer was withdrawn 
by Metcalfe, but not before Perley had accepted with enthusiasm.51 This near-
achievement was to heighten his exasperation with his own colony's politi-
cians in the years ahead. 
The publication of the Report had set its own sequence of events in 
motion within the colony. The Attorney and Solicitor General gave their 
opinion that the Executive Council could lease Indian lands on its own author-
ity, but would require instructions from London before selling them.52 As 
numerous petitions were coming in from those identified in the Report as 
squatters, the Executive Council decided to take action. Perley had urged 
that the occupants of Indian lands be given the chance to legalise their posi-
tion, and it was decided to place an advertisement in the Royal Gazette 
setting out the conditions for leasing such holdings. Those who wished to 
settle on Indian lands, or, by implication, were already settled, should petition 
46 Stanley to Colebrooke, 13 January, 1 February, 5 June 1842, CO 189/16, ff. 187-190, CO 
188/76, ff. 108-110: CO 189/16, ff. 268-269. 
47 Reade to O'Halloran, 17 May 1842, REX/le/1-g, vol. 16, pp. 274-276; The Courier (Saint 
John), 23 April 1842. 
48 Reade to Perley, 1 August 1843, ibid., vol. 17, pp. 118-119. Another New Brunswick Indian 
did turn up in London in 1851, W. S. MacNutt, New Brunswick: A History (Toronto, 1963), 
pp. 361-362. 
49 Colebrooke to Stanley, 14 May 1842, CO 188/77, ff. 373-375; Stanley to Colebrooke, 5 June 
1842, CO 189/16, ff. 268-269. 
50 Stanley to Colebrooke, 26 August 1842, CO 189/16, ff. 328-329. 
51 Spray, "Perley", loc. cit. 
52 Report of Attorney and Solicitor General, 22 February 1842, CO 188/76, ff. 122-123. 
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the Lieutenant Governor through the Surveyor General's office describing 
the location sought; survey would be made at the applicants' expense and 
leases granted. The whole operation, the advertisement maintained, was to 
reclaim and improve the reserves for the benefit of the Indians.53 The Male-
cites, at least, did not agree with this view of their interests. In a petition, 
they expressed their desire to adopt "settled habits", become fanners, go 
to school, "enjoy social blessings"; but they had no hope of advancement 
while their reserves were plundered daily by whites. Only if they were given 
direct control over their lands could they avoid destruction as a tribe; only 
if they held their land in common could they avoid the disruptions that would 
flow from individual ownership. One grant should be issued the whole tribe 
to cover all the lands reserved for them in the Saint John Valley.54 
This dissent went unheeded, and the question, as far as the government 
was concerned, remained simply how to make money out of the reserve lands. 
It soon became apparent that leasing was not the way to do it. No squatter 
would put out the cost of a survey merely to get a leasehold. But something 
should be done, and in 1843 the Assembly began to show some excitement at 
the prospect of ridding itself of the annual grant for Indian relief then running 
at £300. A motion to compensate the Rev. Michael Egan, a Roman Catholic 
missionary singled out for praise by Perley, was defeated because the reserve 
lands should pay "for the temporal and spiritual wants of the Indians.".55 
A Select Committee appointed in February, 1843, to consider the subject 
of the illegal occupation of Crown lands and Indian reserves concentrated 
exclusively on the latter. After noting that squatters performed valuable ser-
vices to progress, the committee recommended that such land as was not 
required for Indian villages be sold in 50 and 100 acre farm lots, while lease-
hold arrangements be restricted to meadow lands for grazing. Lots would be 
offered for sale at an upset price, and payment made over five years; after 
the first instalment the purchaser would be given a ticket of location and 
the actual grant made only with the final payment. The money arising from 
sales and leases would go into an Indian Fund Account bearing interest at 
6%, with the interest appropriated annually for the benefit of the Indians, 
proportioned according to the amount raised in each county. Indian villages 
should be laid out in town, pasture and wood lots, and those wishing then-
own land within the village could be given non-transferable location tickets. 
If an Indian consistently improved his land, he might one day expect to own 
it freehold.56 This was a solid statement of the policy of despoliation cum 
assimilation. 
53 4, 5 May 1842, REX/min, vol. 4, pp. 325, 328-329; Odell to Perley, 6 May 1842, RPS, 10 
November 1838 to 24 August 1842, p. 255; Royal Gazette, 18 May, 25 May 1842. 
54 Petition of 10 January 1843, see fn. 1 above. 
55 15 March 1843, JLA, 1843, p. 174; however,£50 was voted for a missionary to the Malecite 
tribe "at Fredericton" and £.25 for a missionary at Madawaska, 21 March 1843, pp. 205,206. 
56 Committee report. 21, 29 March 1843, ibid., pp. 206-208, 235-236. 
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Legislation was now in the offing. Moses Perley was asked by the Council to 
draft a bill "for the Management of the Indian Lands, and the Settlement of 
the Indians".57 It was nothing more than a courteous gesture, for the resulting 
bill, much to his disgust, was obviously the work of the Assembly's committee. 
The act, 7 Vic. cap. XLVII, passed with a suspending clause in April, 1844, 
and was proclaimed in September. The preamble noted that the reserves 
greatly retarded the settlement of the province and yet were of no use tö the 
Indians. To turn these reserves into an asset it would be necessary to survey 
them definitively and distinguish between the qualities of land they contained; 
then, under Commissioners appointed by the act, to sell or lease at auction 
whatever tracts were thought fit to be offered. The resulting funds would be 
used for the exclusive benefit of the Indians, for the relief of the aged and 
infirm, and for the provision of seed and agricultural implements. The local 
commissioners were empowered to create Indian village tracts on the re-
serves; no mention was made of the costs involved in relocation.58 The hopes 
raised in Perley's Report had been shorn away. There was no longer so much 
as a token gesture towards ameliorating the Indians' condition. They were 
no longer even supposed to pay the costs of "civilizing" themselves; simply 
generate enough money to provide their own relief payments from one year 
to the next. 
Perley was quick to lodge objections, but the Council brushed them aside. 
No one, they said, intended to sell so much land that the Indians would be 
injured thereby; and as for education or religious instruction, mention of 
these had been omitted from the act because they were mere details. As things 
stood, it would be possible to raise money from valuable tracts never before 
used, and the interests of the Indians were stringently safeguarded.59 When 
it came to his turn, the Colonial Secretary was a bit more cautious, warning 
against alienating too much of the reserve land; but he approved the law and 
professed to see it as a measure towards the amelioration of the Indians. 
He did not wish to pursue Perley's objections any further, trusting to the 
discretion of the provincial executive.60 Thus the imperial government wash-
ed its hands of the matter. 
The government of New Brunswick, now for the first time armed with 
legislative authority, issued its instructions to the several commissioners. 
The first task was to determine how much of the Indian reserves should be 
given to the Indians, at the rate of fifty acres per head of family. When this 
was done, the Indians were not to "interfere" with the balance of the land 
in their reserves, which would be offered for sale by advertisement in the 
Royal Gazette. No mention was made of Indian villages with a mix of private 
57 10 June 1843, REX/min, vol. 5, pp. 89-90. 
58 In Statutes of New Brunswick, 1844 (Fredericton, 1845), pp. 147-149. 
59 "Report of Council on Indian Act", 29 July 1844, REX/PX, Indians, 40, pp. 269-273. 
60 Stanley to Colebrooke, 1, 24 August 1844, CO 189/17, ff. 239-241, 249-250. 
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and communal land. Each individual was to receive a location ticket immed-
iately, and after ten years' continuous occupancy be eligible for a free grant 
of his fifty acre lot. After he had received a free grant, an Indian would be 
able to alienate his land, but not before. To those Indians who complained 
of the arrangements it would be necessary to explain "that the Act must be 
carried out for their general benefit". As for the squatters, they had to take 
immediate steps to legalise their position by applying for a survey; to encour-
age this process, the commissioners should cancel any arrangements whites 
had made with local Indians to cut hay or timber or occupy any part of the 
reserve lands.61 
These instructions were even more callous and impractical than the act 
itself, and so thought Moses Perley. Despite his earlier criticisms, he accepted 
appointment as a commissioner "to act in conjunction" with local commis-
sioners, apparently hoping that he would be given some overall supervisory 
control.62 Thwarted in this expectation, he penned a devastating critique of 
the policy early in 1846. Nothing had yet been done under the terms of the 
act, and nothing ever would be; since no squatter could be ejected, there 
was no reason for him to legalise his position. The trifling sum raised to date 
did not nearly cover the costs so far; and the multitude of commissioners pre-
vented any uniform programme from being followed.63 "The Squatters are 
dissatisfied, reckless and troublesome, the Indians are not much better, and 
matters will thus continue until a settlement of existing difficulties takes 
place". He recommended that the whole process laid out in the act and 
instructions be abandoned; that the 1844 law be repealed, and a modification 
of the Canadian policy take its place. The provincial government should make 
treaties for the surrender of all the Indian reserve lands to the Crown, while 
safeguarding, in specific words, the Indians' rights to the land they actually 
occupied; in return for this surrender the Indians should receive annuities, 
about £1,000 worth across the entire province. The Crown would thus have 
a large amount of land to sell without complications, enough to fund the 
annuities; the annuities could be used for the Indian's "moral, social and 
physical" betterment and for the encouragement of his settlement on land 
clearly acknowledged as belonging to him; and the Assembly would be free 
of the need to spend £250 to £300 a year for relief.64 
These suggestions aroused no interest. Perley found time out from his new 
post as Government Emigration Officer at Saint John to return to the charge 
in December, 1847. Once again he urged the conclusion of treaties and the 
61 Saunders to Dibbles, 25 July 1845. RPS, 18 June 1845 to 3 August 1847. pp. 35-39. 
62 Saunders to Perley, 13 September 1845, ibid., pp. 66-67. 
63 In particular, Perley was afraid the commissioners would be too tender to squatters; see, 
for example, his strictures on William Salter, and the latter's defence, Perley to Saunders, 22 July 
1847; Salter to Baillie, 30 November 1847, REX/PA, Indians, n.p. 
64 Perley to Saunders. 14 February 1846, ibid.; Perley's draft of "A Bill for the Management 
and disposal of the Indian Reserves in this Province", n.d., REX/PX 40, pp. 214-222. 
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payment of annuities; again he cited the Canadian example. As he informed 
Surveyor General Thomas Baillie, he had himself laid the groundwork for 
such a policy in conferences with the Indians of Northumberland and Poke-
mouche, where all had agreed on what land could be surrendered for an an-
nuity. Similar agreements could be made with the Indians of Richibucto 
and Buctouche to cover all the Micmac People. There should be no trouble 
in negotiating with the Malecites over the Tobique reserve, and "At Mada-
waska, all the Indians, save one, died last Season, and Consequently there 
would be no difficulty as to that reserve". The Executive Council decided 
to let the message stand over.65 
Meanwhile, portions of Indian reserve lands were being offered at public 
auction. The first to be put up were tracts already occupied by squatters, 
and the presumption was that the squatters themselves would buy in at the 
upset price established by the local commissioner. Anyone else who bought 
would have to pay the assessed value of the improvements extra. The seven 
acres held by William Wishart at Wishart's Point, Tebucintac reserve, for 
example, were listed a t£ lO the lot; 425 acres held by Donald M'Kay on the 
Eel Ground were offered at 3s. an acre.66 But if the squatter did not bid the 
upset price, and no one else showed any interest, what happened then? No 
one was satisfied with the progress made, and no one but Perley had any 
alternative to offer. An Assembly committee reporting in April, 1847, urged 
sale "as soon as possible", and another committee a year later simply re-
peated the hope.67 
"On behalf of the Indians of New-Brunswick", Perley made his last bid to 
influence policy in March, 1848. Reporting directly to Lieutenant Governor 
Colebrooke, he argued that as long as the emphasis remained on selling In-
dian lands to accelerate settlement, no worthwhile amounts of money would 
be raised. If the government continued to sell the land cheaply on credit, 
there would soon be no land and no funds for the support of the Indians. 
The government should either lease the lands on a long term basis, or legis-
late an annuity for the Indians as compensation for the low prices being 
realised. There should be no further sales until the amount of land required 
by the Indians had been precisely determined.68 Colebrooke was sympathetic, 
but realised there was no way he could persuade the Assembly. He agreed 
that it was impossible to raise an adequate fund from land sales and urged 
that some method be found t o get higher prices and prompter payment. He 
hoped the Assembly would reconsider those provisions in the act, and would 
65 Perley to Baillie, 30 December 1847, REX/PA, Indians, n.p. 
66 Advertisement in Royal Gazette, 11 August 1847. 
67 12 April 1847, JLA, 1847, pp. 357-358; report of 3 March 1848, Indian Affairs in New-Bruns-
wick, pp. 5-6. The earlier report did note that Indians should be allowed to retain, in addition 
to the 50 acre farms available to families, "suitable" woodlands and campgrounds. 
68 Report of 3 March 1848, ibid. 
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guarantee the Indian Fund before allowing any further sales.69 As one of his 
final gestures in office, Colebrooke wrote a gloomy report to the Colonial 
Secretary concerning the fate of the Indians. He followed Perley's critique 
exactly: the act had not worked, and since the Assembly refused to grant an 
annuity the only hope left was to raise some money for the Indians by putting 
part of their lands out on long leases. Lord Grey referred the letter to the 
imperial Commissioners of Colonial Lands and Emigration.70 
Colebrooke's dejection was replaced by the vigour of Sir Edmund Head. 
Instructed to give his views on the situation of the Indians, he quickly for-
warded Grey a lengthy report. There were, explained, only two ways to deal 
with aboriginal peoples throughout the world: give them full legal rights or 
treat them as children, thereby limiting their "discretion and capacity . . . for 
dealing with their own affairs". Only the latter course was possible in New 
Brunswick, where the Indians could be too easily cheated out of their land 
by whites. Head illustrated his views with excerpts from Perley's Report 
that were extensive enough to take up the bulk of his dispatch. But although 
he may have relied on Perley for information, he did not draw the same con-
clusions; in fact, he agreed with the Assembly that the act of 1844 had never 
been given a fair trial. Head proposed to give it a chance with a new set of 
instructions. He hoped to raise enough revenue to provide relief for the In-
dians, applying any surplus to the industrial education of the young. He did 
not really expect any improvement however: the Indians were a harmless 
people, and their numbers continued to decline. It is not hard to imagine the 
future Sir Edmund Head saw in store for them.71 
Certainly that future held no place for Moses Perley. Sir Edmund informed 
Grey that he would not employ Perley in any capacity among the Indians. 
His zeal had antagonized both Council and Assembly, and led him to think 
of himself as the "diplomat of an independent power", treating between the 
Indians and government. Apparently Perley had let slip the fact that when 
he announced the 1844 act to the Indians at Burnt Church he had read along 
with it his own criticisms of the law. Head did not approve of such conduct 
in an officer of the government, although he emphasised that he was fault-
ing Perley for an excess of zeal rather than incompétence. As a farewell 
tribute, the lieutenant governor enclosed Perley's memorandum on the his-
tory of the Indians of the province with his dispatch.72 That sad review showed 
how accurately Perley saw what was happening, and how such perception 
had made him a sore embarrassment. As he summed up the history: 
The first step was a joint occupation of the country by the Indians and 
69 4 April 1848, REX/min. vol. 6, pp. 210-211. 
70 Colbrooke to Grey, with notations, 8 April 1847, CO 188/104, ff. 375-377. 
71 Head to Grey, 17 August 1848, CO 108/106, ff. 180-201. 
72 Ibid. 
Acadiensis 21 
British settlers: the second was assigning to the Indians certain districts 
of counties, within which they were not to be disturbed, the next, con-
fining each Tribe to a certain tract or portion of land called a reserve and 
finally, reducing those reserves by degrees until in 1842 only one half 
remained . . . . and to conclude by selling all that remains . . . without 
any provision for their [the Indians'] future welfare.73 
The Colonial Secretary approved Head's suggestions,74 which were embodied 
in new regulations drawn with the avowed object of making the Indian Act 
work more efficiently. Head's continuing interest is shown in his own hand-
written contributions to the draft of the document. Sixteen commissioners 
were appointed or re-appointed, two for each district, by name. Striking 
at one abuse that had already appeared, the new regulations forbade the 
sale of any land actually under cultivation by the Indians. To slow down the 
process of alienation, only those who were actually squatting on Indian 
land before the passage of the act were to be allowed to apply to buy their 
lots. All such requests were to be in by March 1, 1850, and those applying 
after that date would forfeit any claim to the value of the improvements 
made. Payment was to be over three years, not five, with a 15% discount for 
a lump sum. The cost of surveys, to be paid by the applicant, was fixed at 
2d. an acre. The regulations emphasised that commissioners reporting lands 
for sale must also recommend portions of the reserves suitable for Indian 
village sites.75 
But regulations, especially those examined in this essay, are made to be 
broken, and it seems unlikely that the new restrictions were always observed. 
The demand for land was not as great as the advocates of rapid settlement 
hoped. Sometimes there was collusive bidding when auctions were held, 
sometimes no response at all. In 1862 Commissioner John Dibblee reported 
only one person appeared at the last auction he had arranged, and the solitary 
bidder, "thinking there was so little interest manifested, got discouraged 
and gave it up".76 Instalment purchasing did not work as well as the govern-
ment expected. Visiting the Tobique reserve in 1865, D. Wilson found that 
no payments beyond the first had been made on the four lots sold there in 
the previous three years: $600 of the $800 purchase money was in arrears. 
Matters had been further complicated by the fact that two of the lots sold 
and not paid for had been re-sold. Three squatters who had paid the 2d. an 
acre survey charge had paid no instalments at all, yet were still in possession 
of the land. The general hope was to sell the improvements after investing 
as little money as possible in land title. One enterprising individual had paid 
73 Memorandum of M. H. Perley, CO 188/106, ff. 205-233. 
74 Grey to Head, 11 November 1848, CO 189/18, ff. 328-331. 
75 "General Regulations", 7 July 1849, REX/PA, Indians, n.p. 
76 Dibblee to McMillan, 20 May 1862, REX/PA, Indian Lands, n.p. 
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the first instalment on one lot and was squatting on two others. Further along 
the Saint John river the situation was the same, only of longer duration. There, 
sales had been made before the appointment of the incumbent commissioner, 
who had been unable to find out from the Crown Lands Office who owed 
what. When asked why he was behind on his payments, the standard squatter 
response was that since others hadn't paid, why should he?77 
The land sales policy that had begun in 1844 had run its course by 1867 
when the new government of Canada assumed control of Indian affairs. 
10,679 1/2 acres of reserve land had been sold to 109 whites; £2,853.10.0 had 
been raised for the Indian Fund. Thirty-one of the purchasers, with 3235 1/2 
acres of land, were in arrears to the extent of £565.6.6.78 By its own estimation, 
the Crown Lands Office had sold 16% of the 66,096 acres of reserve land. 
None had been leased, and possibly as much as 10,000 acres were still held 
by squatters. 
The Indian Fund never met the demands upon it for relief, let alone social 
and moral improvement. The Assembly continued to pass annual grants, 
with what ill grace may be imagined. Between 1855 and 1857 they had to 
find £1,083, an increase over the average of the previous decade.79 The 
administration of Indian affairs remained chaotic. Matters beyond the scope 
of individual commissioners continued to go directly or via the Provincial 
Secretary's office to the Surveyor General, the Crown Lands Commissioner, 
the Executive Council, or, if extra money was needed for emergencies, the 
Assembly itself. Severe outbreaks of sickness entailed special pleading for 
relief funds.80 The building and repair of fences had to be discussed in Coun-
cil.81 Three orphans from the Meductic reserve were given executive per-
mission to attend parish school.82 Commissioner Dibblee was authorised to 
pay the estate of Peter Fraser up to £200 for land to be given the Indians 
in exchange for a lot on the Meductic.83 Another dispute at Burnt Church 
over the election of chiefs came before the Council.84 Lola Selmore and twen-
ty-four Indian descendants of those who at one time lived at St. Andrews 
77 "Report on Tobique Indians", 11 May 1865, REX/PA, Indians, n.p. 
78 Sutton to Langevin, 2 December 1867, with enclosures, ibid. Acreage sold by reserve: Eel 
Ground, 1,062; Indian Point, 602 1/2; Wishart's Point, 7; Big Hole, 224; N.W. Miramichi, 76; 
Richibucto, 1,805; Pokemouche, 100; Kouchibougmas, 200; Tobique, 2,055; Tabucintac, 1,461; 
Little South West (SW), 498; Little South West (N), 421; Little South West (NW), 712; Little South 
West (S), 1,177; Buctouche, 279. All acreage estimates are mine, based on the listing in the en-
closures. 
79 March 19, 1858, JLA, 1858, pp. cccclxxxiii - v. 
80 Report of Stafford Benson,/L/l, 1854 (1), pp. cclxviii - ix; Tilley to Dibblee, 31 July, 8 August 
1855, Council Letter Book D, vol. 168, p. 172, PANB. 
81 Tilley to Dibblee. 8 August 1855, ibid.. p. 173; Close to Toldevery. 21 June 1851, REX/PX 40. 
pp. 196-197. 
82 1 September 1855, Council Letter Book D, p. 189. 
83 Partelow to Perley, 2 April 1851; Partelow to Dibblee, 30 July 1851. Provincial Secretary 
Letter Book C, vol. 86, p. 156, PANB. 
84 Robichau to Tilley, 12 October 1858. REX/PX 40, p. 44. 
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petitioned for lands they had been deprived of by the Loyalists.85 Angry In-
dians had to be told that the moneys arising from their particular lands were 
not being embezzled by the commissioner, but had to be paid to the Indian 
Fund and only released on executive order.86 As at the beginning, so at the 
end, everything referring to the Indians was treated on an ad hoc basis. 
Writing from the Indian Office, Ottawa, in October, 1867, Hector Langevin 
requested information from New Brunswick's Crown Lands Commissioner, 
R. Sutton. What lands had been granted or leased to the Indians? What 
Indian land sold or leased to whites? What use had been made of the moneys? 
Please send a copy of the last annual report on Indian affairs and a list of the 
officers of the Indian Department.87 The reply was slow in coming, and a 
prompting telegram followed a month later.88 Sutton then responded, send-
ing back a copy of the 1844 act, a list of reserves and sales therefrom, but 
no annual report, because there was none; and, for the same reason, no list 
of officers in the Indian Department. As for the proceeds of the sales, he 
had no idea what had happened to them, as all the moneys were paid over 
to the Provincial Treasurer.89 
Predictably, there had been no prior consultation between province and 
dominion over the transfer of responsibility for the Indians. The commission-
ers were left on their own and correctly assumed that what had once gone 
to Fredericton now went to Ottawa. There the official immediately in charge 
was William Spragge, Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs, and he knew 
nothing of New Brunswick. The first petition that arrived in Ottawa was 
from the Malecites of the Tobique and completely mystified everyone in 
the department.90 Soon, the "Governor General of the New Dominion of 
Canada" was being petitioned over derelict rail fences, and receiving advice 
as to what the province would have done if it still had jurisdiction over such 
matters.91 Henry Livingston and John Little, commissioners of Kent County, 
expressed their desire to hear something from the dominion over how it 
wanted the Indian lands managed. Certainly, wrote Little, it was to be hoped 
that the Indian Affairs Department would "take some action to fix up the 
affairs of the Reserves in this County which stand in much need of being 
settled".92 The commissioners for Gloucester county forwarded their accounts 
85 14 February 1854, JLA. 1854(1), p. 19. 
86 "Report on Tobique Indians", 11 May 1865, REX/PA, Indians, n.p. 
87 Langevin to Sutton, 26 October 1867, ibid. 
88 Langevin to Sutton 30 November 1867, William Spragge Letter Book, R.G. 10 [hereinafter 
Letter Book], vol. 527, p. 54, Public Archives of Canada [hereinafter PAC]. 
89 Sutton to Langevin, with enclosures, 2 December 1867, REX/PA, Indians, n.p. 
90 Langevin to Sutton, 21 March 1868, Letter Book, vol. 527, p. 225. 
91 Petition of J. A. Bulley, Kingsclear, Indian Affairs Register, R.G.10 [hereinafter Register], 
vol. 312, B895, PAC. 
92 Livingston and Little to Peter Mitchell, Little to [Mitchell?], 21 August 1868, Register, 
vol. 370, N53. 
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with the caution that they had always distributed relief in the manner de-
scribed "and our attention to the accounts was always considered satisfac-
tory by the Province of New Brunswick".93 William Salter also dutifully for-
warded his accounts of expenditures to Ottawa,94 but no one there heard 
his request for payment of the annual pension to several chiefs who would 
be expecting their money on St. Ann's day. He sent an anguished letter to 
the provincial secretary begging that the lieutenant governor pay the pension 
since Ottawa refused to answer him. The stern notation in the margin of the 
appeal noted the reply, by telegram: "We cannot interfere with Ottawa in 
Indian Affairs".95 The sigh of relief must have been audible all the way from 
Fredericton to Burnt Church. 
When John Dibblee and Charles Perley of Woodstock found themselves 
also slighted by the dominion government, they did not carry their troubles 
to the province; instead, they unleashed a blast not even Ottawa could ignore. 
Their Indians had not received the allowances paid regularly from 1845 
until Confederation on the basis of $40 and $60 in alternate years, plus special 
donations "repeatedly" granted. The commissioners had applied for the 
money four months previously only to be told that the Deputy Superinten-
dent General was out of town — and had heard nothing since. This was a 
"very unsatisfactory" situation, and made it impossible for them to carry 
out their task "to have justice done to the Indians under our care".96 Ergo, 
Confederation was unjust. 
It was this letter that made Spragge decide to extract more information 
than was contained in the meagre fare provided by Sutton. On the basis of 
those documents, the dominion had decided to grant $1,200 a year to the New 
Brunswick Indians, since that was the sum that appeared in the province's 
accounts for 1866.97 But obviously there must be money somewhere else, and 
in a prolonged memorandum Spragge wrestled with the convoluted finances 
of the province, only to discover that the grant had been consistently over-
spent.98 What he needed was some "precise statistical information" on the 
Indians in order to arrive "at an Opinion as to the Manner and degree in which 
they can be benefitted".99 The result was a questionnaire directed to each 
local commissioner. In addition to the details required, Spragge probed into 
93 Bishop and Hickson to Langevin, 14 April 1869, ibid., vol. 312, B896. 
94 Salter to Langevin, 22 June 1868, ibid., vol. 370, N44. 
95 Salter to Beckwith, 23 July 1868. ibid. Spragge decided that he did not like the idea of do-
nating $40 to the St. Ann's day festivities. Report of 11 September 1868, Letter Book, vol. 722, 
p. 476. 
96 Dibblee and Charles Perley to Langevin, 26 October 1868, Register, vol. 370, N52, with 
notations by Spragge of the forthcoming questionnaire. 
97 Privy Council Report, 28 April 1868, Register, vol. 370, N55. 
98 Memorandum on the Indians of New Brunswick, 22 October 1868, Letter Book, vol. 722, 
pp. 494-499. 
99 Memorandum, 18 November 1868, ibid., vol. 723, pp. 17-18. 
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more general areas. What type of assistance was usually offered the Indians? 
What attempts had been made at education, and with what success? Wouldn't 
agriculture and education prosper if the Indians were collected into larger 
communities than at present? It was a familiar litany.100 
The replies that were received came in quite promptly. They provided 
basic information about numbers, but few suggestions as to policy. "I assist 
them with the Charity that religion inspires and with the aid that government 
gives", wrote the Reverend Brother Agathe of the Indians in Westmoreland 
County.101 The Richibucto Indians were "generally industrious when sober", 
reported their commissioner, and suggested continuing the policy of selling 
lands for the Indian Fund.102 From Restigouche County, Commissioner Bar-
barie agreed that larger communities would promote agriculture and educa-
tion, but doubted either would survive the attractions of the lumber camp.103 
There was nothing new. 
The viewpoint of the dominion differed little from that of the province. 
An Indian agency would be desirable in New Brunswick because although 
the commissioners were inexpensive they had done nothing to promote edu-
cation or agriculture. The Indians should be encouraged to combine in larger 
units to acquire "the habits and pursuits of civilized life".104 Thirty to forty 
acres should be given each family and assistance to build a log cabin.105 But 
the immediate need, Spragge decided, was relief, to enable the Indians to 
get through one more year. Minister Langevin agreed: this was the "most 
pressing" matter at hand.106 And so Indian affairs in New Brunswick contin-
ued as they had ever been: a question of relief, of maintaining the hand to 
mouth existence of a people forced out of their lands and lives by the white 
immigrants. 
Everything considered, it is remarkable that the native peoples of New 
Brunswick survived at all. They had none of the safeguards provided the 
Indians of Canada, no corps of permanent paid officials to speak for them, 
no missionaries capable of lobbying for their interests in London, no sub-
ventions from the imperial government. Completely on their own, compris-
ing less than one half of one per cent of the population at mid-century, they 
were for years totally neglected, the victims of a non-policy; and when one 
100 Langevin to Sutton enclosing questionnaire, 3 December 1868, REX/PA, Indians, n.p.; 
Circular to Dibblee and Perley, 26 November 1868, Letter Book, vol. 528, p. 17. 
101 Brother Agathe to Langevin, 16 December 1868, Register, vol. 304, A171. 
102 Livingston to Langevin, 23 December 1868, ibid., vol. 384, R146. 
103 Barbarie to Langevin, 22 December 1868, ibid., vol 312, B807. One other report came in 
from the Rev. James Quinn
 Qf St. Stephen, who had only two Indian families in his area. Pre-
sumably he received by mistake the circular intended for the Rev. John Quinn, Indian commis-
sioner of Charlotte County. Quinn to Langevin, 18 December 1868, ibid., vol. 382, Q27. 
104 Memorandum on the Indians of New Brunswick, 22 October 1868, fn. 98 above. 
105 Notes by Spragge, 4 January 1869, ibid., vol. 723, p. 49. 
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was instituted, it was to dispossess them of their reserve lands to make way 
for progress and to free the white taxpayer of the costs of relief. The policy, 
challenged by Colebrooke and confirmed by Head, could have led to the 
total disappearance of the reserve lands in a very few years and the expulsion 
of the surviving Indians into white society without a shred of support. That 
this did not happen was no fault of the colonial or imperial governments. 
New Brunswick was simply not that attractive as an agricultural society, 
and the reserve lands, mostly marginal at best, were not needed by whites 
for their family farms. But the New Brunswick pattern, had it been applied in 
Canada, would have proved to be one for the "final solution" of Indian affairs. 
